HAZOP Action Register Digitisation for OISD 118 Compliance

Superseded nodes are HAZOP study entries whose P&ID references point to drawings that have since been revised (tags renamed, equipment replaced, lines re-routed). The HAZOP conclusions were drawn against outdated process conditions, meaning the recommendations may no longer protect the plant. OISD 118 audits flag this as a process-safety gap because the action register references nothing that exists on the current plant. Pathnovo found 31 such nodes that the plant had no prior awareness of.

The plant estimated 6 weeks for four engineers to manually review the 2,400-page study and cross-check every node reference against the current P&ID set. The OISD 118 audit was only 8 weeks away, leaving no buffer for re-HAZOP on any superseded nodes that surfaced. Pathnovo's 4-week turnaround left the plant 4 weeks of buffer to action the 31 superseded nodes before the auditor arrived.

The original was a 2,400-page narrative PDF with tabular data interleaved through descriptive text, queryable only by manual page-by-page reading. Pathnovo extracted each of the 1,847 actions into discrete rows with structured fields (action ID, owner, status, deadline, node reference, P&ID revision, recommendation, closure evidence). This is the first time the plant's process safety team could query the register by owner, by deadline, by superseded-node flag, or by closure status.

The register is now a living document. When a new P&ID revision is issued, Pathnovo's pipeline re-runs the node mapping automatically and flags any newly-superseded nodes for re-HAZOP review. Action closure evidence loaded by the plant's process safety team updates the register status without re-extraction. The plant's prior practice was a one-time PDF study that drifted out of date the moment the next P&ID revision was issued.

OISD 118 audit findings on process safety scope (HAZOP register gaps, superseded node references, missing closure evidence) typically trigger a formal corrective-action programme with PNGRB notification, a re-audit cycle, and in severe cases licence-condition impact. Passing with zero findings meant the plant avoided the corrective-action programme, the re-audit fee, the management diversion of multiple engineering and HSE FTEs, and any insurance-premium consequence of a public process-safety finding.